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Abstract 
In the oil and gas industry hydrogen is used in a large 
number of processes, mostly in hydroprocessing units such 
as hydrotreating, hydrocracking and other refining processes 
that increase the hydrogen-to-carbon ratio. To satisfy the 
need for H2, refineries usually have a dedicated Hydrogen 
Production Unit (HPU). Given the wide range of processes 
that HPU supplies and the fact that cost of operation of this 
kind of unit is rather high, it stands to reason that any kind 
of interruption in unit operation will affect the whole refining 
process. From Risk Based Inspection (RBI) point of view, 
HPU can be a very challenging unit to deal with, primarily 
due to the wide range of operating processes conditions as 
well as different operating fluids. As a result of applying the 
innovative methodology for risk assessment, it is shown that 
significantly higher number of damage mechanisms are iden-
tified in regard to the number of damage mechanisms that 
would be identified by applying traditional methodology, 
due to the fact that both active and passive damage mecha-
nisms are identified. Concept of barriers such as measures 
that are able to restrict, reduce or preferably eliminate 
damage mechanisms identified in HPU are introduced and 
discussed. Innovative methodology was successfully applied 
in the case of a refinery in the Middle East. 
Ključne reči 
• procena rizika 
• mehanizmi oštećenja 
• prerada gasa 
• proizvodnja vodonika 
• barijere 
Izvod 
Vodonik se u naftnoj i gasnoj industriji koristi u velikom 
broju procesa, najviše u postrojenjima za preradu vodonika 
kao što su hidro-prerada, hidrokreking i drugi preradni 
procesi koji povećavaju odnos vodonika i ugljenika. Kako 
bi se zadovoljila potreba za H2, rafinerije obično imaju 
posebno postrojenje za proizvodnju vodonika (HPU). Imaju-
ći u vidu širok spektar procesa koje HPU snabdeva i činje-
nicu da je trošak rada postrojenja ovakvog tipa prilično 
visok, može se zaključiti da će bilo kakav prekid u radu 
postrojenja imati uticaja na ceo proces prerade. Sa stano-
višta Analize zasnovane na rizicima (RBI), HPU predstavlja 
vrlo izazovno postrojenje usled činjenice da je prisutan 
širok spektar radnih procesnih parametara kao i različitih 
radnih fluida. Kao rezultat primene inovativne metodologi-
je za procenu rizika prikazaće se da je broj identifikovanih 
mehanizama oštećenja značajno veći u odnosu na broj meha-
nizama koji bi bio identifikovan primenom tradicionalne 
metodologije, usled činjenice da se identifikuju i aktivni i 
pasivni mehanizmi oštećenja. Takođe, biće prikazano defi-
nisanje i razmatranje koncepta barijera, kao mera za ogra-
ničavanje, smanjenje ili uklanjanje mehanizama oštećenja 
identifikovanih u HPU. Inovativna metodologija je uspešno 
primenjena na slučaju rafinerije na Bliskom istoku. 
INTRODUCTION 
Components, equipment and systems used in the oil and 
gas industry are subjected during their operation to chemi-
cal, electrochemical and physical factors which may deteri-
orate their integrity. Such integrity deterioration results in 
deformation, defects, performance degradation or damage, 
thereby reducing the ability of the asset to perform its 
required function efficiently and effectively whilst protect-
ing health, safety and the environment. Some of the most 
common deterioration mechanisms are corrosion, fatigue, 
creep, erosion, hydrogen related cracking, wear, overload, 
temperature expansion and contraction. These degradation 
mechanisms represent a major hazard in the oil and gas 
industry as these failures may pose, if not monitored or 
mitigated properly, serious threats to human life, the envi-
ronment and financial investment. It is important to note that 
components, equipment and systems may fail following the 
onset of these degradation mechanisms even though all the 
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necessary rules and practices are followed during the design 
and fabrication stages. Ensuring their integrity is paramount 
to maintaining plant integrity and its safe operation. 
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is a risk based, multidis-
ciplinary, decision support process with a goal of determin-
ing and documenting an optimum cost-effective inspection 
plan for pressure equipment while in compliance with 
safety regulations. The RBI method defines the risk of 
pressure equipment failing as the product of two factors: the 
Likelihood or Probability of Failure (PoF) and the Conse-
quence of Failure (CoF) /1, 2/. Failure is defined as a 
termination of the ability of a system, structure, equipment, 
or component to perform its required function of fluid 
containment (i.e. loss of containment) which can result as a 
leakage of fluid into the atmosphere, or a full rupture of the 
pressure component. The likelihood and consequences of 
failure are determined for each item through qualitative 
assessment or, in some cases, a more rigorous semi-quan-
titative or quantitative assessment. The assessment should 
be based on identified degradation mechanisms, design 
data, process data, inspection and operating history, and 
equipment location relative to human and environmental 
influences. Following documents on which a part of the risk 
assessment is based are presented: 
– ASME PCC-3: Inspection Planning Using Risk-Based 
Methods /3/; 
– API RP 571: Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equip-
ment in the Refining Industry /4/; 
– API RP 580: Risk-based Inspection /1/ 
– API RP 581: Risk-based Inspection Methodology /2/; 
– API RP 584, Integrity Operating Windows /5/; 
– API RP 970: Corrosion Control Documents /6/. 
HYDROGEN PRODUCTION 
‘Hydrogen is required in refineries for a large number of 
hydrotreating and hydrocracking processes, to remove 
sulphur, nitrogen, and other impurities from hydrotreater 
feed and to hydrocrack the heavier gas oils to distillates. A 
limited quantity of hydrogen is produced in the catalytic 
reforming of naphtha, but generally the quantity is insuffi-
cient to meet the requirements of hydrocracker and hydro-
treating units. As hydrogen production is capital intensive, 
it is always economical to recover hydrogen from low-
purity hydrogen streams emanating from hydrotreating and 
hydrocracking units and minimize production from hydro-
gen units. In the absence of hydrogen recovery, these streams 
end up in fuel gas or are sent to flare. Most refinery hydro-
gen is produced by the steam reforming of natural gas. The 
conventional hydrogen production in refineries involves the 
following steps: 
– natural gas desulphurization; 
– steam reforming; 
– high- and low- temperature shift conversion; and 
– trace CO and CO2 removal by methanation.’ /7, p. 153/ 
A typical hydrogen production unit is shown in Fig. 1, 
and is fully taken from API RP 571 /4/ with suggested 
damage mechanisms. 
 
                        Figure 1. Typical hydrogen reforming unit per API RP 571 /4, pp. 5-109/. 
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The CO2 striper, CO2 absorber and methanator, shown in 
bottom part of Fig. 1, can be replaced with Pressure Swing 
Adsorption (PSA) unit, which is the case for the modern 
refinery in question. The reasons for using PSA unit are 
given in the following subsection. 
Process description 
The Hydrogen Production Unit (HPU) provides the total 
hydrogen requirement for hydrotreating units, e.g. Diesel 
Hydrotreater (DHT) unit, Kerosene Hydrotreater (KHT) 
unit, Atmospheric Residue Desulphurization (ARDS) units, 
Hydrocracker (HCR) unit, Naphtha Hydrotreater (NHT) 
unit and etc. The HPU utilizes steam reforming to generate 
hydrogen. Hydrogen produced in the HPU also covers require-
ments in various hydrotreating units in the refinery. In addi-
tion to the nominal capacity of the HPU, the plant produces 
some extra hydrogen as required for recycling and mixing 
with the feed to the HPU when operating on feedstock with 
insufficient hydrogen content as compared to requirement 
for hydrogenation of the process feed. A PSA unit is used 
to obtain the desired product hydrogen purity of minimum 
99.8 vol% hydrogen. 
The HPU consists of the following sections: 
– desulphurization of process feed by hydrogenation and 
H2S absorption on ZnO; 
– pre-reforming; 
– parallel steam reforming and heat exchange reforming; 
– medium temperature shift conversion; 
– process gas heat recovery and cooling; 
– gas purification by pressure swing adsorption. 
Pressure swing adsorption 
‘The pressure swing adsorption (PSA) route is simpler 
than the conventional route, in that the low-temperature CO 
conversion, CO2 removal by liquid scrubbing, and methana-
tion to catalytically remove the remaining oxides of carbon 
are replaced by a molecular sieve system. This system works 
by adsorbing CO2, CO, CH4, N2, and H2O at normal operat-
ing pressure while allowing hydrogen to pass through. The 
molecular sieve is regenerated by lowering the pressure and 
using some of the product to sweep out the desorbed impu-
rities. Due to this pressure cycling, it is commonly referred 
to as pressure swing adsorption system.’ /7, p. 162/. 
According to /8/, there are five general features of the 
PSA system that to a large extent explain both the advantages 
and limitations of the technology and hence determine the 
suitability for a given application: 
1. product purity; 
2. yield or fractional recovery; 
3. concentration of trace impurities; 
4. energy requirements; 
5. scaling characteristics. 
Operating procedures, material selection and other consid-
erations 
In the following paragraphs, operation procedures for 
upset and/or start-up/shut-down conditions, which may have 
an impact on subsequent criteria for damage mechanism 
identification, are presented: 
– the hydrogen required for desulphurization is contained in 
the ARDS membrane Tail Gas used as part of the process 
feed or hydrogen product recycled to the feed gas com-
pressor; 
– hydrogen requirement for the desulphurization during 
start-up is delivered from outside; 
– during short time operation at start-up or shut-down with 
only steam flowing to the pre-reformer it is required to 
add hydrogen to the process steam. This hydrogen is 
supplied from an emergency hydrogen storage. 
The following considerations apply in regard to material 
selection for the equipment and piping: 
– for vessels, design is kept to carbon steel with appropriate 
corrosion allowance for the service well under creep range 
and without presence of CO/CO2 and water, with corre-
sponding corrosion allowances between 1 mm (for ‘clean’ 
service) and 3 mm; 
– for the higher temperature services containing hydrogen, 
materials of choice are low and medium alloyed carbon 
steels (1.25% Cr - 0,5% Mo, up to 2.25% Cr - 1% Mo) 
with similar corrosion allowances, 1-3 mm; 
– for the parts of the systems containing CO/CO2 and/or 
wet gas (water), material of choice has been set to 
SS 304L/H, SS 316L up to SS 321H for high temperature 
service. Due to the highly corrosive nature of the fluid, 
even for stainless steels, the corrosion allowance is set to 
be between 1 to 2 mm (NOTE: L stainless steel grades - 
with low carbon content are usually used in highly corro-
sive environment where intergranular corrosion is possible; 
H stainless steels grade - with high carbon content are 
usually used at temperatures above 500°C, for long-term 
creep service); 
– for the high temperature hydrogen service, the limits of 
the steel applicability have been determined based on so-
called ‘Nelson curves’, given typically in API RP 941 /9/. 
Due to recent failures (since 2010) where High Tempera-
ture Hydrogen Attack (HTHA) has been identified as a 
source of failure, the technology for investigating HTHA 
susceptibility and inspection methods for detection and 
assessment of HTHA are being developed. As per API 
RP 581 /2/, it has led to significant revision/lowering of 
the overall values of the Nelson curves and of removal of 
0.5Mo steels altogether from the list of materials to be 
used in hydrogen service. Additionally, it is suggested 
that the most current edition of API RP 941 /9/ should be 
consulted for guidance. 
Table 1 shows possible fluid composition, while Table 2 
shows characteristics, properties and additional information 
of the considered operating fluid. 
Table 1. Composition of working fluid in the shift converter part 
of the HPU. 
Substance vol % 
H2 55 - 62 
methane 4 - 7 
water 15 - 19 
CO2 12 - 15 
CO 1 - 5 
NOTE: Sum should always be 100% 
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Table 2. Operating characteristics of working fluid in the shift 
converter part of the HPU. 
Working Fluid H2O/HC/H2/CO/CO2 
Phase Vapor/2-Phase 
MDMT* °C -3 
Operating temperature °C 45 - 319 
Operating pressure bar 21,7 - 23 
Design temperature °C 360 
Design pressure bar 27.1 
Possible free water during 
normal operation 
Yes/No Yes 
Possible free water during 
upset operation 
Yes/No Yes 
Hydrogen service Yes/No Yes 
Material of construction  SS 304L/1.25Cr-0.5Mo 
Corrosion allowance mm 1.5/3 
PWHT Yes/No Yes 
* Minimum design metal temperature 
DAMAGE MECHANISM AND BARRIER IDENTIFICATION 
The extension of the Innovative approach from the one 
shown in the ASME PCC 3 /3/ is to identify both active and 
passive (potential) damage mechanisms and the conditions 
under which passive (potential) can be activated. For the 
purpose of distinguishing the two proposed types of damage 
mechanisms, the principle of Integrity Operating Windows 
(IOWs) will be used. Another extension of the Innovative 
approach is introduction of the barriers principle. Criteria 
for damage mechanism identification based on the Innova-
tive approach are presented in /10/. Same methodology and 
principles are being applied in this case with the variation 
for the criteria taken from API RP 970 Annex B /6/, shown 
in Table 3. Definition of the Corrosion Loops (CLs) is also 
applied. In order to facilitate the readers’ understanding of 
the further steps, the principles for the identification of damage 
mechanisms are presented below: 
1. categorize/classify equipment in CLs; 
2. analyse fluid and operating condition; 
3. analyse possible operating modes of the system (normal 
condition, upset conditions, downtime, etc.) 
4. apply criteria for damage mechanism identification per 
ASME PCC-3 /3/ by conditions defined in previous points; 
5. apply criteria for damage mechanism identification per 
API RP 970 Annex B /6/, Table 3. 
For the whole HPU, the following damage mechanisms 
have been identified: 
1. High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA) 
2. Creep/stress rupture 
3. Oxidation 
4. Thermal fatigue 
5. Temperature embrittlement 
6. Thermal shock 
7. Short term overheating 
8. Reheat cracking 
9. Boiler water / condensate corrosion 
10. Metal dusting 
11. Sigma phase / chi embrittlement 
12. Sour water corrosion (presence of water and H2S) 
13. CO2 corrosion (presence of CO2 in the stream) 
14. High temperature creep 
15. High temperature corrosion 
16. Corrosion under Insulation (for insulated parts) 
17. Atmospheric corrosion (for not insulated parts) 
18. Erosion – droplets 
19. Erosion / erosion corrosion 
20. Brittle fracture 
21. Mechanical fatigue 
As stated in the section regarding hydrogen production, 
HPUs are considered to be fairly large and complicated due 
to the presence of numerous operating fluids (according to 
the RBI methodology, when a significant change occurs 
either in process or chemical parameters, then it is consid-
ered to be a different operating fluid in question). 
Table 3. Important criteria for damage mechanism identification 
as per operating and process conditions /6, Table B.1/. 
High temperature damage mechanisms (> 230°C) 
b) Is there a potential for brittle fracture (e.g. hydrogen 
embrittlement, temper embrittlement, 0.5Mo steel) of heavy wall 
hydro processing equipment from rapid heating/cooling or 
pressurizing below the minimum pressurization temperature? 
c) Is there a potential for accelerated creep from operating outside 
of the operating window (e.g. higher temperature or pressure or both)? 
f) Is there a potential for accelerated sulphidic corrosion from 
gradual increase of sulphur content, temperature or inadvertent 
increase of other sulphur species such as H2S or mercaptan 
content? 
j) For alloys operating above about 370°C, are there any high 
temperature aging embrittlement phenomena that might lead to 
brittle behaviour when equipment is pressurized at lower 
temperatures? 
k) Is there a degradation effect due to metal dusting, carburization, 
nitriding, etc. 
l) Is there hot spot due to refractory lining failure or any other 
overheating? 
Low temperature (aqueous) corrosion and stress corrosion 
cracking damage mechanisms 
b) Is there a potential for rapid corrosion at or downstream of 
injection or process mixing points due to heating/cooling, 
condensation/evaporation, reaction, between the injecting and 
mixing streams, etc.? 
d) Is there a potential for rapid corrosion due to change in flow 
rates, changes in flow regime, e.g. vaporization, flashing, or other 
multiphase flow conditions? 
f) Is there a potential for rapid localized corrosion at hot spots as a 
result of direct contact between heat tracing and process piping, 
e.g. lack of standoff or improper use of heat transfer material? 
q) Can solids be present causing increased erosion-corrosion (i.e. 
catalyst carryover, accumulation of corrosion products, etc.)? 
r) Is there a potential for increased corrosion or cracking beyond 
piping spec breaks due to process changes or upsets? 
s) Is there potential for increased corrosion in the inlet zone or at a 
vapour/liquid interface? 
v) Is there a potential for inadvertent process contamination that 
could cause stress corrosion cracking? (e.g. wet H2S, caustic, 
amines, chlorides, polythionic acids)? 
External damage mechanisms 
c) Can changes in process conditions lead to increased corrosion 
under insulation (CUI), e.g. idling of normally hot equipment, 
equipment in cyclic service above and below 120 °C, or exposure 
of stainless steel equipment to external chloride cracking? 
d) Is CUI possible? 
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Identification of damage mechanisms and possible barri-
ers shall be oriented only to a section of the HPU process 
recognized as critical due to the possibility of condensation 
appearance. The chosen section includes parts of the unit 
from shift conversion, through the PSA, up to the hydrogen 
product and product offgass lines. Condensation in the selected 
part of the HPU is regarded as extremely dangerous in respect 
to the construction material primarily due to the increased 
corrosion rate induced through CO2 corrosion. Also, there 
is a very small possibility that the line can be contaminated 
with H2S if the desulphurization process is not operating 
within normal parameters, thus activating the sour water 
corrosion damage mechanism. Operating process condi-
tions are as shown in Table 3. 
Active damage mechanisms 
Based on the principles for damage mechanisms identifi-
cation as per Innovative approach, the following active 
damage mechanisms have been identified for the selected 
section: 
1. CO2 corrosion (presence of CO2 in the stream) 
2. High temperature corrosion 
3. Corrosion under insulation (for insulated parts) 
4. Atmospheric corrosion (for not insulated parts) 
5. Erosion – droplets 
6. Mechanical fatigue 
7. Thermal fatigue 
Passive damage mechanisms 
The following passive or potential damage mechanisms, 
which can become active due to changes in any number of 
observed parameters or conditions (e.g. change in fluid 
composition, change in process parameters, change in mate-
rial, etc.) have been identified, based on the Innovative 
approach for the selected section: 
1. Sour water corrosion (presence of water and H2S) 
2. High temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) 
3. Erosion/erosion corrosion 
4. Brittle fracture 
Barriers 
Identification of passive damage mechanisms is carried 
out by using a what if analysis where realistic consequences 
of barrier failures, which are taken into account in order to 
prevent the occurrence, or reduce the impact of active 
damage mechanisms, are observed. A barrier can be defined 
as a measure, either introduced subsequently or via initial 
design, which restricts, reduces or preferably eliminates a 
damage mechanism. A barrier can be physical in nature 
(selected material of construction, addition of corrosion 
allowance, etc.) or not (various process controls, heat treat-
ment and etc.). A number of systems or procedures can also 
be defined and used as barriers, as long as they reduce or 
remove effects of damage mechanisms. The identified barri-
ers for part of the HPU are shown in Table 4. 
Four barriers can be regarded as essential for the analysed 
section of the HPU: 
1. Material of the structure; can be viewed as a barrier that 
eliminates almost all failure modes because it used with 
intention to avoid occurrence of damage mechanisms 
altogether. 
2. Corrosion allowance; a form of barrier that is primarily 
used to reduce effects of corrosion. It is a highly effective 
barrier, but only when the system is working within 
normal parameters. 
Table 1. Identified barriers for the analysed part of the HPU. 
Barrier 
Properties 
Used for failure mode Remarks Efficiency in service Barrier degradation 
Material of 
structure 
all primarily to avoid DM* altogether highly effective NA 
Design all primarily to avoid DM altogether highly effective NA 
Installation fabrication DM  highly effective NA 
Corrosion 
allowance 
corrosion/thinning  highly effective yes, corrosion rates 
Heat treatment metallurgical, cracking 
ensure metallurgical structure, stress 
relief 
highly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Post weld heat 
treatment 
cracking stress relief, avoid cracking highly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Temperature 
control 
all avoid critical conditions for DM mostly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Pressure control all 
avoid critical conditions for DM usually 
by reducing stress1 
mostly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Flow control corrosion/thinning avoid critical conditions for DM mostly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Fluid composition 
control 
all avoid critical conditions for DM mostly effective 
depends on operation 
periods outside IOWs 
Coating corrosion/thinning/cracking 
prevent contact between material and 
fluid 
highly effective Yes, coating aging 
Tracing corrosion/thinning 
electrically or steam tracing - to maintain 
fluid temperature to prevent i.e. 
condensation 
mostly effective 
depends on time in 
operation and operating 
philosophy 
* DM – damage mechanism 
1) continuous cyclic service due to pressure alteration as the result of PSA process 
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3. Pressure control; a barrier that can be especially important 
for the selected section of the HPU due to the continuous 
cyclic service caused by pressure alteration as the result 
of PSA process. Appearance of condensation is also 
possible when reducing pressure, as a part of the PSA’s 
operation process, if traces of water are present in the 
stream. 
4. Tracing; a barrier that can be introduced in order to remove 
the possibility of condensate forming. In other words, 
tracing makes sure that all other barriers stay active and 
effective. 
All other barriers should not to be neglected or regarded 
as less important. In essence, for the normal operation of 
the HPU it is required that all barriers perform as intended. 
Some of the barriers are time dependent (corrosion allow-
ance, coating, tracing and etc.) and this statement should be 
noted, and inspection should be planned in accordance to 
anticipated barrier’s end-of-life. 
CO2 corrosion is the damage mechanism that is expected 
to be active during the service of the HPU due to the nature 
of the process, and it can be regarded as the most aggressive 
of the active damage mechanisms. CO2 corrosion results 
when CO2 dissolves in water to form carbonic acid. At least 
three conditions are required to be fulfilled for this damage 
mechanism to be active: presence of CO2, water and mate-
rial susceptible to damage mechanism. The first condition 
cannot be influenced by anything available (within reasona-
ble limits) – operating fluid in the selected part of the HPU 
has a chemical composition that includes CO2 in medium 
amount. The third condition is easily influenced by material 
selection, which can be, and is regarded as a barrier. 
Finally, to completely remove CO2 corrosion, one should 
make an effort to preclude the situation where water is 
present in the operating fluid, condensates. CO2 corrosion 
appears as localized thinning and is somewhat easily reduced 
by introduction of Tracing (either steam or electrical, depend-
ing on the resources at hand). For the period of operation of 
10 years, with the postulated barrier efficiency, the damage 
equivalent expected to be found on the equipment is of the 
same amplitude as the system operating without the barriers 
for a period of half a year to one year. Taking into account 
this damage mechanism in such limited manner, previous 
estimations of corrosion rates have to be further adjusted/ 
increased to include these factors. 
As mentioned, some of the barriers are time dependent, 
meaning that their efficiency will either significantly drop 
after a period of time or a barrier will completely stop 
performing its purpose. Corrosion allowance or tracing are 
typical examples that can illustrate this statement. After a 
corrosion allowance is removed by the effects of damage 
mechanisms, vessel and/or pipping will be subjected to 
increased risk of failure. After 10 years or more of service, 
the tracing barriers usually have increasing failure rates – 
leaking of steam tracing tubes is a frequent failure mode 
after a period of service. Both outcomes are expected, but 
interconnection between barriers and expected failures is 
something that it is important and to be noted. 
Leakage of steam tracing tubes can lead to increased 
corrosion rates due to the Corrosion under Insulation (CUI). 
The time frame when frequent leakage in the steam tracing 
system starts to happen is around 10 years. At the same 
time, the applied coating would start to degrade, thus 
increasing the equipment’s susceptibility to the CUI. With 
the increased leak frequencies from the tracing system 
combined with the progressive degradation of the coating, 
one can deduce that the CUI would become one of the 
major concerns in keeping the integrity of the equipment 
and especially interconnecting piping systems. 
Inspection guidelines example 
As an example of application of innovative method, one 
can take the example of CO2 corrosion and tracing system 
case applied to future inspection planning. Detailed inspec-
tion plan cannot be established at this stage, but guidelines 
and rules for the inspection can be established. The follow-
ing guidelines can be applied for the previously mentioned 
example: 
1. During the operation, the shutdown times have to be 
recorded, especially without steamout or passivation (N2 
purging), as they might cause the CO2 corrosion to be 
active during the shutdown periods; 
2. During the operation, the time periods where steam trac-
ing was not operational or having degraded performance 
should be recorded (i.e. due to steam loss due to leakage 
in the steam coils); 
3. Time periods from points 1 and 2 should be summed up 
– it should also be considered that these periods have 
CO2 corrosion as an active mechanism – and based on 
that postulate, the corresponding corrosion rate and maxi-
mal possible loss of wall thickness i.e. using correspond-
ing technical module from API RP581 /2/; 
4. If the times or estimated losses are significant according 
to the judgement of the qualified inspector, or if the 
expected wall thickness loss exceeds 75% of the corro-
sion allowance, full visual (internal) inspection followed 
by wall thickness measurements in the identified cor-
roded areas of the equipment or piping should be 
planned. Also, it should be considered that the loss of 
wall thickness is expected to be highly localized. 
As already discussed, the barrier failure, steam coil leak-
age, would also be a potential source of the CUI. The 
piping system and the equipment are however coated corre-
spondingly, so for the first couple of turnarounds, only spot 
testing and external visual inspection of the insulation 
would suffice to identify the potential spots where CUI 
might be expected. However, after a period after the 
expected coating life – normally 10 years or more, more 
detailed inspection of the external of the equipment should 
be planned. To this purpose, the exact locations and dura-
tions of steam coil leakages should be recorded/documented 
and coupled with the coil repair activities, the potential CUI 
damage spots should be visually inspected, thickness meas-
ured and if possible, coating reapplied. A special considera-
tion should be given to the possible spots of moisture accu-
mulation according to API RP 583 /11/ and EFC 55 
Guideline /12/. 
Damage mechanism and barrier identification on hydrogen ... Identifikacija mehanizama oštećenja i barijera primenom ... 
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CONCLUSION 
As a consequence of the dynamic behaviour of damage 
mechanisms and barriers, one has to note that the measured 
and expected corrosion rates might have to be adjusted after 
certain periods of time - i.e. after the points where the 
barrier has been ‘spent’ or operates with decreasing effi-
ciency. In other words, although operating under same 
conditions in the future, one cannot take for granted that the 
expected damage rate - corrosion rate in this case - will 
remain constant but rather has to be re-evaluated. Further, 
the inspection methods applied, and inspection scopes have 
to be revised and adjusted according to the newly assessed 
severity of damage mechanisms, mostly due to the failure 
or degradation of the installed damage barriers. 
Taken as an example, the failing steam tracing system 
leading to an increase of the CUI, one can note that in some 
cases the barriers might, in the long run, result in the aggra-
vation or introduction of additional damage mechanisms in 
the system. With the integrative approach as suggested in 
this paper, this type of interaction might be more apparent 
or easier to recognize and, in the end, managed appropri-
ately. 
To conclude, the most commonly used RBI approach of 
‘set it and forget it’ might be in a number of cases mislead-
ing - the re-assessment and re-evaluation of the RBI is 
required periodically in the full extent. With the proposed 
method, one can setup the system that documents the 
dynamics of the damage mechanisms and installed barriers, 
also taking into account the degradation or failure of the 
barriers thus automatically triggering the RBI review in the 
cases when certain barrier degradation levels are reached or 
when certain IOWs are not being upkept in service. 
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